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Comment Mario B. Lamberte
The paper empirically shows that idiosyncratic unemployment shocks lead
to consumption ﬂuctuation of similar magnitude in the United States and
Indonesia. One may conclude from these results that developing econ-
omies like Indonesia have adequate social insurance because they can
smooth consumption paths in the face of shocks despite the absence of for-
mal social insurance similar to those that can be found in developed econ-
omies. If so, the implication is that formal social insurance for developing
economies oﬀers small marginal welfare gains. However, this may not nec-
essarily be the case. By developing a normative framework, Chetty was
able to demonstrate that a small drop in consumption after a shock can be
attributed to either of the two: (a) agents are able to easily and inexpen-
sively smooth consumption by borrowing or through informal insurance
mechanisms, or (b) agents are risk averse to ﬂuctuations and are inclined
to undertake costly consumption-smoothing actions. In the ﬁrst case, for-
mal social insurance will yield small marginal welfare gains, while in the
second case the same will generate large marginal welfare gains. He then
went on to provide three sets of evidence for the presence of high risk aver-
sion in Indonesia. This being the case, formal social insurance can there-
fore yield large marginal welfare gains.
One of the interesting proofs oﬀered by Chetty that point out the possi-
bility of having high risk aversion in Indonesia is that households under-
took costly consumption-smoothing methods by reducing educational ex-
penditures on children to deal with temporary idiosyncratic shock. As is
well known, the Philippines was also adversely aﬀected by the recent Asian
ﬁnancial crisis, and there were pieces of evidence that households at-
tempted to fend oﬀa decline in consumption by making some adjustments.
Reyes et al. (2001, 168), for instance, made the following conclusion from
their analysis:
Even if ﬁgures from diﬀerent data sources did not match, still it was clear
that the crisis had the following eﬀects: (1) enrollment in both elemen-
tary and secondary school levels had increased but at a lower rate than
the usual rate; (2) households had allowed their older children already in
school to continue, but postponed the enrollment of new entrants both
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ment project supported by USAID.at the elementary and secondary levels; (3) dropout rate of those already
in school was not aﬀected in the elementary and private secondary
school but increased in public secondary schools;1 and (4) children had
smaller food and transportation allowances.2
Given the previous, the Philippines could be in the same league as In-
donesia as far as this paper is concerned.
The inverse relationship between the drop in consumption and risk aver-
sion is key to the paper’s argument that formal social insurance can have
large marginal welfare gains. Since the drop in consumption in the face of
idiosyncratic shock has been observed to be small in Indonesia, empiri-
cally proving the existence of high risk aversion becomes crucial. While I
agree with the author that a la Binswanger method of inferring risk aver-
sion can lead to misleading results, however, I still feel uncomfortable with
the author’s method of inferring risk aversion. Take for example the ﬁrst
indicator of risk aversion that is based on average household income cited
by the author. One can imagine a situation wherein two groups of house-
holds have the same average household income, yet one may show greater
risk aversion than the other. That is, when faced with two investments with
the same expected return but two diﬀerent risks, one prefers the one with
the lower risk. Another is labor supply response. When some members of
the family are involuntarily unemployed, looking for a menial job while the
household head is temporarily unemployed may not be a costly labor re-
sponse. Unfortunately, I could not oﬀer an alternative method for empiri-
cally verifying degrees of risk aversion of households.
Assuming that high risk aversion is present in developing economies, an
important issue that must be addressed, which the paper has intentionally
not covered, is how to ﬁnance such a formal social insurance system. Most
developing economies are usually confronted with a tax structure and tax
administration system that is ineﬃcient, resulting in low tax eﬀort. This
cannot be easily ﬁxed in a reasonably short period of time, and institutions
to run a social insurance scheme are either absent or ineﬃcient, thereby ex-
posing such scheme to a greater moral hazard problem. That is why the role
of an informal insurance system and informal credit market as consump-
tion-smoothing mechanisms cannot be underemphasized in developing
economies. Unfortunately, the author has not examined in detail the im-
portance of these mechanisms relative to risk aversion in Indonesia. In the
Philippines, for instance, 63 percent of households surveyed availed from
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1. This may mean that poor households who normally send their children to free public
high school education were more adversely aﬀected by the crisis and asked older children to
leave school to save money (i.e., food and transportation allowance) and probably to put them
in the labor market.
2. It could be that parents force their children to consume cheaply priced, but low quality
food and to walk to school instead of taking a bus, jeepney, or tricycle. So, while children con-
tinue to go to school, their school performance suﬀers.credit during the crisis period mainly from informal money lenders (Reyes
et al. 2001). Of the amount borrowed, 27 percent went to support school
expenses of children; 21 percent to pay for medical expenses of sick house-
hold members; 19 percent for house repair; and another 16 percent to sup-
port household activities. Borrowing from the informal credit market
could be a less costly response than reducing human capital accumulation.
While I agree that NGOs are not a reliable source of social insurance, rel-
atives and neighbors are known to ﬁll that gap to a certain extent.
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